1. Akuntansi Pemerintahan
2. Judul Skripsi Akuntansi Sektor Publik 2012
3. Sistem Pengendalian Manajemen Sektor Publik

The statistic test of first hypothesis shows that mean of discretionary accruals at a year before violation is significantly larger than that at the year debt covenant violation. This result supports debt covenant hypothesis. But, mean difference at the year of violation and at a year after violation does not provide the support for the hypothesis. The statistic test of second hypothesis shows that mean of discretionary accruals of firms violating debt covenant at a year before and at the year violation of debt covenant is not significantly larger than that of control firms. Thus, we can conclude that there are other factors besides violation of debt covenant that motivate management to perform earnings management.

This research is a principal investigator in the Masters thesis, Saint Universitas Gadjah Mada. I offer the thanks to Prof. Baridwan Zaki, M. Sc thesis as mentors for advice, time and discussion. BackgroundAgency theory see the company as a nexus of contracts is an organization under contract with several parties such as contracts with shareholders, suppliers, employees (including managers) and other parties involved (Scott, 2000). The Company also has contractual ties with the creditors if the company is involved as one of the debt financing.

Most companies use debt as the source of funding because it can improve performance of managers due to fears of job losses and if the performance increase, shareholders are willing to pay its share price is more expensive (Jensen and Meckling 1976 in Main 2000).Companies that have debt contracts and other contracts would wish to minimize the cost associated with contract contract-contract (contracting theory), such as negotiation kos, kos monitoring contract performance, the possibility of renegotiation, and the cost estimates if bankruptcy or other failure (Scott, 2000). Therefore, we need a tool to assess the performance of companies in an effort to protect the interests of both parties are bound by a contract (to minimize conflicts of interest). The tool of any information generated internally by the company. Companies that will go public usually begins with a decision to conduct an initial public Offerings (IPO) conducted in the primary market (primary market).

Subsequently, these shares will be traded in perjual-called capital market or secondary market (secondary market). Shares at an initial offering price is determined by agreement between the company issuers with securities underwriter (an underwriter) as the required funds, issuers want high initial price. Conversely, an underwriter as underwriter seeks to minimize the risk of bear. In this type of comitment full underwriting, the underwriter will purchase the shares not sold in the primary market. These circumstances make the underwriters are not willing to buy stocks that are not sold.

Efforts is to negotiate with the issuer so that these shares are not too high a price, even likely underpriced. Is an interesting phenomenon because it experienced by most of the world's capital markets. Since it is often in the primary market (IPOs) are found of underpricing (Ritter, 1991; McGuinnes, 1992; Husnan, 1993; Aggrawal, et al., 1993; Ernyan and Husnan, 2002). Research conducted by Aggrawal, et Al.

(1993) concluded that the IPO in the short term indicated the occurrence of underpricing, but in the long term return that is negative going. This underpricing profitable investors on the one hand but on the other hand would be detrimental to the issuer because the funds collected are not maximal. This study finds that the managers of public firms in Indonesia do not use accounting method choices as earnings management strategy. Some of them choose to use a little of accruals accounting flexibility and prefer both GAAP violations and intercompany transactions strategies. This study identifies that the motivations of debt covenant, political cost and owners’ wealth as well as the strategy of accruals accounting flexibility are earnings management practices with global value.

Otherwise, earnings management practices with local value consist of motivation caused by both debt restructuring and going concern constraint and strategy through GAAP violations and intercompany transactions. The financial statements have been prepared on the accrual basis of accounting (accruals accounting). Accrual accounting has the advantage that the company's earnings and its components measured by accrual accounting generally provides a better indication about the economic performance of companies than the information generated from the aspects of current receipts and payments (FASB 1978). Accrual accounting also has weaknesses. (2003) criticized that accrual accounting is not perfect and the rules that obscure the financial report which aims to provide cash flow information and company capabilities in generating cash. Vagueness of this information due to accrual accounting is complicated and vulnerable to manipulation. This vulnerability is called management earnings (earnings management).

The aims of this research at examining the influence of corporate governance mechanisms, such as, board of commisioner composition and size, and audit committee existence on the earnings management practice in public bank companies listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange. The samples of this research is all of public banks companies existed in Indonesia in the year of 2000-2004 which were listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange. The research data were collected from public bank’s financial statement for the period of 2000 until 2004, from Indonesian Banking Directory published by Bank Indonesia from 2001 until 2005, and also from each company’s websites. Purposive sampling method was used to determine research sample. From this method, we have collected 100 observations from 20 public banks companies/5 years. By using multiple regression analysis as the research method, the results shown that corporate governance mechanisms, namely, board of commisioner composition and size, and also audit committee existence influenced earnings management of public banks companies which have been detected by using specific accrual model from Beaver and Engel (1996). Year 2001 recorded in the financial scandal involving the manipulation of public company financial statements by PT Lippo Tbk and PT Kimia Farma Tbk (Boediono, 2005).

It is proved that the practice of manipulation of financial reports is still being done by corporate party despite being away from the crisis period 1997-1998. One cause of this condition is the lack of implementation of corporate governance.

Evidence showed weak corporate governance practices in Indonesia led to deficiencies in corporate decision-making and actions (Alijoyo et al., 2004). Corporate governance is the concept proposed to improve business performance through supervision or monitoring management performance and ensuring accountability of management to the stakeholders with a framework based on rules.

The concept of corporate governance as proposed for the achievement of corporate management more transparent to all users of financial statements. If this concept is applied properly it is expected that economic growth will continue to rise in line with the transparency of corporate management a better and will benefit many parties.

Performed this research is to find the effect of the audit committee's effectiveness, in Which the effectiveness is from the perspective of input and process, to the type of company's earnings management, whether it is efficient or Opportunistic. The audit steering committee's effectiveness is Measured by the audit committees of GCG survey results from the index is developed by Arsjah Which (2005).

In Addition to finding the effect of the audit committee's effectiveness, this research is Also Performed to find the effect of components of the audit committee's activity, its meeting with the company's internal (IAU) and the external auditor and Its financial literacy to the type of company's earnings management. More effective, active and financially literate audit committees are the Expected to Be Able to make the company's more efficient. This research is Also using the Board of Commissioners ('BOC') index and the external auditors' index from a survey by Arsjah (2005), besides the BOC's percentage and the auditor's size, to find the effect of BOC's and external auditor's quality to the type of company's earnings management. This research Finds That BOC index index and external auditors tend to make the company's earnings management more efficient than the BOC's percentage and the auditor's size. It shows That the BOC's percentage and the auditor's size are not appropriate to be Used as a proxy of BOC and audit quality.

This research studies the effect of ownership structure and related party transactions on the informativeness of accounting numbers. Indonesian sample is interesting to be examined due to low quailty of accounting numbers, concentrated ownership, family control and high-dominant related party transactions. Using the model levels and changes models, studies show That this concentration of ownership increases informativeness of the accounting numbers to the capital market. However, concentrated ownership by family or the informativeness of accounting numbers decreases to the capital market. Further, the magnitude of related party transactions That has been earned or Used, as reported in one of income statement accounts, increases informativeness of accounting numbers. Otherwise, the magnitude of related party transactions That has not earned or Used, as reported in one of balance sheet accounts, Decrease informativeness of accounting numbers. Since 1994, Indonesian accounting standards have been prepared with reference to internationally accepted accounting standards (Internatioanal Accounting Standards / IAS or converted into International Financial Reporting Standards / IFRS since 2001).

Akuntansi Pemerintahan

However, several studies provide evidence that the quality of accounting information in Indonesia is still low. Based on the Price Water House Coopers survey in 1999 in the eyes of international investors, Indonesia is one of the worst countries in terms of 'in standards of auditing and compliance, accountability to shareholders, standards of disclosure and transparency and Board processes (PWC, 1999). Graham and King (2000) discovered the power of information in accounting numbers to the market price is relatively low compared with Asian countries is another. Accounting information resources in Indonesia are under the state of the Philippines, Thailand and Korea.

(2002) found that the level of earnings management in Indonesia is relatively high (ranked the 15th largest among the 31 countries) using data between 1990 and 1999. The ranking of earnings management in Indonesia to Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. Menurut Statement of Financial Accounting Concept (SFAC) No. 1, informasi laba merupakan perhatian utama untuk menaksir kinerja atau pertanggungjawaban manajemen. Selain itu informasi laba juga membantu pemilik atau pihak lain dalam menaksir earnings power perusahaan di masa yang akan datang. Adanya kecenderungan lebih memperhatikan laba ini disadari oleh manajemen, khususnya manajer yang kinerjanya diukur berdasarkan informasi laba tersebut, sehingga mendorong timbulnya perilaku menyimpang, yang salah satu bentuknya adalah earnings management.

Parameter kinerja perusahaan yang mendapat perhatian utama dari investor dan kreditor dari laporan keuangan adalah laba dan arus kas. Pada saat dihadapkan pada dua ukuran kinerja akuntansi keuangan tersebut, investor dan kreditor harus yakin bahwa ukuran kinerja yang menjadi fokus perhatian mereka adalah ukuran kinerja yang mampu menggambarkan kondisi ekonomi perusahaan serta prospek pertumbuhan dimasa depan dengan lebih baik. Oleh karena itu, selain kedua ukuran kinerja tersebut investor dan kreditor juga perlu mempertimbangkan karakteristik keuangan setiap perusahaan. Karakteristik keuangan yang berbeda-beda antar perusahaan menyebabkan relevansi angka-angka akuntansi yang tidak sama pada semua perusahaan. Corporate governance merupakan isu yang sedang hangat dibicarakan sebagai suatu alat yang bisa memecahkan masalah dalam pengelolaan dan pertanggungjawaban perusahaan modern. Corporate governance adalah serangkaian mekanisme yang digunakan untuk membatasi timbulnya masalah keagenan.

Dengan informasi yang dimiliki, pengelola bisa bertindak yang hanya menguntungkan dirinya sendiri dengan mengorbankan kepentingan pemilik. Hal ini mungkin terjadi karena pengelola mempunyai informasi mengenai perusahaan, yang tidak dimiliki pemilik perusahaan (assymmetric information).

Corporate governance diperlukan untuk mengendalikan perilaku pengelola perusahaan agar bertindak tidak hanya menguntungkan dirinya sendiri, tetapi juga menguntungkan pemilik perusahaan, atau dengan kata lain untuk menyamakan kepentingan antara pemilik perusahaan dengan pengelola perusahaan. Kepentingan utama pemilik dana adalah return yang memadai atas dana yang ditanamkan. Pengelola akan mengutamakan kepentingan pemilik apabila aktivitas yang dilakukan dan keputusan yang diambil ditujukan untuk meningkatkan nilai perusahaan, hal ini berarti juga akan meningkatkan kekayaan pemilik. Good Corporate Governance secara difinitif merupakan sistem yang mengatur dan mengendalikan perusahaan untuk menciptakan nilai tambah (value added) untuk semua pemegang saham. Ada empat komponen utama yang diperlukan dalam konsep good corporate governance ini, yaitu fairness, transparency, accountability, dan responsibility. Keempat komponen tersebut penting karena penerapan prinsip good corporate governance secara konsisten terbukti dapat meningkatkan kualitas laporan keuangan. Prinsip good corporate governance yang diterapkan dengan konsisten dapat menjadi penghambat aktivitas rekayasa kinerja yang mengakibatkan laporan keuangan tidak menggambarkan nilai fundamental perusahaan.

Manajemen laba adalah pemilihan kebijakan akuntansi oleh manajer untuk mencapai tujuan khusus. Terdapat dua cara yang saling melengkapi dalam berfikir tentang manajemen laba. Pertama, perilaku oportunistik manajemen untuk memaksimumkan utulitasnya dalam kompensasi, kontrak, dan kos politik. Kedua, perspektif kontrak efisien ketika manajemen laba dilakukan untuk menguntungkan semua yang terlibat dalam kontrak. Earnings management sebagai intervensi dalam proses pelaporan keuangan eksternal dengan tujuan memperoleh beberapa kebutuhan pribadi. Earnings management terjadi ketika manajemen menggunakan keputusan tertentu dalam pelaporan keuangan dan penyusunan transaksi-transaksi yang mengubah laporan keuangan hal ini bertujuan untuk menyesatkan para stakeholder tentang kondisi kinerja ekonomi perusahaan, serta untuk mempengaruhi penghasilan kontraktual yang mengendalikan angka akuntansi yang dilaporkan.

Ada tiga sasaran yang dapat dicapai oleh manajer dalam melakukan manajemen laba meliputi: minimalisasi biaya politik (political cost minimization), maksimalisasi kesejahteraan manager (manager wealth maximization), dan minimalisasi kas pendanaan (minimization of financing cost). Berbagai bentuk manajemen laba seperti taking a bath, perataan laba (income smoothing), maksimalisasi atau minimalisasi pendapatan dapat dilakukan oleh pihak manajemen dengan memanfaatkan peluang yang ada dalam standar akuntansi seperti penerapan kebijakan akuntansi atau pemilihan metode akuntansi yang digunakan. Adanya kemungkinan manipulasi ini karena adanya fleksibilitas yang diberikan oleh GAAP dan karena sulit untuk menekankan pelaporan keuangan yang fleksibel. Manajemen laba adalah suatu tindakan yang dilakukan oleh pihak manajemen yang menaikkan atau menurunkan laba yang dilaporkan dari unit yang menjadi tanggung jawabnya yang tidak mempunyai hubungan dengan kenaikkan atau penurunan profitabilitas perusahaan untuk jangka panjang.

Dengan demikian, manajemen laba dapat diartikan sebagai suatu tindakan manajemen laba yang mempengaruhi laba yang dilaporkan dan memberikan manfaat ekonomi yang keliru kepada perusahaan, sehingga dalam jangka panjang hal tersebut akan sangat menggangu bahkan membahayakan perusahaan. Manajemen laba sebagai suatu intervensi dengan maksud tertentu terhadap proses pelaporan keuangan eksternal dengan sengaja memperoleh beberapa keuntungan pribadi. Manajemen laba terjadi ketika manajer menggunakan judgment dalam pelaporan keuangan dan penyusunan transaksi untuk merubah laporan keuangan, sehingga menyesatkan stakeholder tentang kinerja ekonomi perusahaan atau untuk mempengaruhi hasil yang berhubungan dengan kontrak yang tergantung pada angka akuntansi yang dilaporkan. Manajemen laba merupakan pemilihan kebijakan akuntansi untuk mencapai tujuan khusus. Dengan membagi sampel penelitian kedalam dua kelompok, yaitu kelompok yang memiliki tingkat akrual diskresioner tinggi dan kelompok yang memiliki tingkat akrual diskresioner rendah.

Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa perusahaan yang memiliki komite audit dengan mandat yang jelas untuk pengawasan (oversight) dan pemonitoran pelaporan keuangan, proporsi anggota luar (yang bukan anggota manajemen perusahaan) yang tinggi, atau paling tidak memiliki satu pakar keuangan, secara signifikan mengurangi tindakan manajemen laba pada perusahaan tersebut. Penelitian juga menemukan bahwa komite audit yang melakukan rapat lebih dari dua kali tiap tahun memiliki besaran manajemen laba yang rendah.

Penelitian menguji pengaruh dari mekanisme corporate governance seperti yang disyaratkan oleh Bapepem dalam Bursa Efek Jakarta. Sampel yang digunakan adalah perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Jakarta di tahun 2002-2004 sebesar 44 perusahaan. Hasil penelitiannya menunjukkan bahwa komite audit dan kepemilikan institusional dapat berperan sebagai mekanisme good corporate governance dalam membatasi manajemen laba. Sedangkan untuk kepemilikan manajerial dan komisaris independen tidak mampu menjadi mekanisme good corporate governance. Hasil lainnya menunjukkan bahwa ukuran dewan direksi yang lebih sedikit dapat menciptakan mekanisme good corporate governance yang lebih baik. Penelitian pengaruh mekanisme corporate governance terhadap manajemen laba pada perusahaan CEO.

Hasil penelitiannya menunjukkan (1) Kepemilikan manajerial mampu menjadi mekanisme corporate governance pada perusahaan Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO), karena hubungan antara kepemilikan manajer dengan manajemen laba berhasil diterima yaitu bahwa manajemen laba yang dilakukan pada periode sebelum Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO) mempunyai hubungan negatif dengan kepemilikan manajerial. Semakin tinggi saham yang dimiliki oleh manajemen semakin rendah tingkat manajemen laba yang mungkin dilakukan; (2) Earnings management mempunyai hubungan negatif dengan kepemilikan institusional, bahwa kepemilikan saham oleh intitusi dapat menjadi kendala bagi perilaku opportunistic manajer yang memanfaatkan earnings management untuk kepentingan pribadinya.

Pengaruh manajemen laba terhadap return saham perusahaan dengan kualitas audit sebagai variabel pemoderasi. Hasilnya menunjukkan bahwa variabel aliran kas operasi, akrual diskresioner, akrual non diskresioner dan interaksi antar variabel akrual diskresioner dengan KAP non Big- 5 secara statistik berpengaruh terhadap return saham perusahaan. Sedangkan pada penelitian yang dilakukan oleh Kusuma dan Sandra (2004) menemukan bahwa audit laporan keuangan tidak untuk mendeteksi terjadinya manajemen laba, tetapi audit dilakukan untuk meningkatkan kredibilitas laporan keuangan. The purpose of the study is to examine the effect of the information of Corporate Social Responsibility disclosed in the companies' annual reports on the informativeness of earnings (Measured by earnings response coefficient, ERC). The study hypothesized That there is' the negative effects of CSR Disclosures on the ERC level since the CSR Disclosures Which Provide investors more information is not captured by the accounting earnings.

The sample of the study related parties in 108 annual reports in 2005 of the companies listed at the Jakarta Stock Exchange. The empirical results of the study show That the level of CSR Disclosures has a negative effect on the ERC as Predicted.

The results of the study indicate That investors assessed the CSR information in disclosed by the companies on their annual reports for decision on their investment. Several previous studies showed that the number of companies that do social responsibility disclosure (hereinafter abbreviated as CSR - Corporate Social Responsibility) in its annual reports is increasing. Similarly, the number and type of information that is disclosed increasing CSR (Ernst & Ernst, 1978; Trotman, 1979; Kelly, 1981; Pang, 1982; Guthrie, 1982; Gray, 1990; Gray et al, 1993; Sayekti, 1994). Many companies are increasingly recognizing the importance of implementing CSR programs as part of its business strategy. A global survey conducted by The Economist Intelligence Unit shows that 85% of senior executives and investors from various organizations to make CSR as a primary consideration in decision-making (Warta Ekonomi, 2006). Research Basamalah and Jermias (2005) showed that one reason is the management of social reporting for strategic reasons.

Although not yet be compulsory, but it can be said that almost all companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange has disclosed information about CSR in its annual report in a variety of levels (Sayekti, 2006). From an economic perspective, the company will disclose any information if such information will enhance shareholder value (Verecchia, 1983, in Basamalah et al, 2005). With the adoption of CSR, the company will gain social legitimacy and to maximize long-term financial strength (Kiroyan, 2006).

This indicates that companies that use CSR expects to get positive response by market participants. Literature about the existing voluntary disclosure to provide an understanding that the disclosure of such information is used in the valuation and corporate finance firm (Core, 2001).

The expropriation of minority shareholders by Those of controlling shareholder is the main agency conflict in firms with concentrated ownership. The expropriation is Obvious Pls cash flow rights and control rights are separated through pyramiding and cross-holdings.

The ultimate ownership concept is Used to Investigate identify the separation and its implications on dividends. By using the sample consists of the firms listed in the Jakarta Stock Exchange for the period from 2000 to 2004, empirical Evidences That shows the cash flow rights and control rights do not go together but have Different implications. The concentration of cash flow rights is an incentive to avoid expropriation. Can this be seen from Evidences of positive effects of cash flow rights on dividends. On the other hand, the control rights concentration is an incentive to generate private benefits through expropriation. This conclusion is supported by evidence of the negative effects of control rights on dividends. When control rights Exceed cash flow rights, the controlling shareholders have higher incentive to expropriate by participating in firm's management.

The controlling shareholders' participation in management makes Them more freely to generate private benefits. But the incentive is lower Pls help a firm has the second controlling shareholder. The second controlling shareholder cans mitigate the controlling shareholder's incentive to expropriate.

Agency problem is a central issue in financial literature since Berle and Means (1932) investigate the ownership structure of listed companies. In companies with dispersed ownership, individual shareholders have no control over the management to act in harmony with the interests of shareholders. Principal agency problem in a company like this is the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. But in companies with concentrated ownership, no shareholder can control the management or even part of the management itself. Agency problem that stands out in a company like this is the agency conflict between shareholders pengendali1 with minority shareholders. This research studies for existence and determinant of accounting conservatism, ESPECIALLY related to the conflict of interest considering Between investor and creditor litigation risk manager incentive due typess and firm strategy.

The Objectives of this research are: (1) to Investigate the effect of the conflict of interest on accounting conservatism, (2) to Investigate the effect of litigation risk on the relations Between the conflict of interest and accounting conservatism, (3) to Investigate the effect of strategy types on the relations Between the conflict of interest and accounting conservatism. Result of the research shows, That there are variation of accounting conservatism, inter-firm level.

Judul Skripsi Akuntansi Sektor Publik 2012

The first hypothesis testing result shows That conflict of interest influences positively on accounting conservatism. The second hypothesis testing result shows the relations litigation moderate risk 'Between the conflict of interest and accounting conservatism, but the moderation of role is weaken.

This result is not supported Predicted Hypothesis. The third hypothesis testing result shows the strategy firm types moderate the relations Between the conflict of interest and accounting conservatism. The result shows Pls Prospector is firm strategy, the positive relations of conflict of interest and accounting conservatism, is weaker.

When a defender is firm strategy, the positive relations of conflict of interest and accounting conservatism is Stronger. The result supports Hypothesis Predicted. The objective of this study is to determine the influence of accounting conservatism on the assessment of corporate equity valuation and the ABILITY of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) in interacting the effect of accounting conservatism to the corporate value. Sample in this research is manufacturing companies listed in the Jakarta Stock That Market for the financial report in 2000-2005 periods. Number of sample is 23 companies with 115 observations. The accounting conservatism, conservatism, the proxy by instrument variables (VIKV223).

The assessment of corporate proxies by equity market-to-book ratio. The mechanism of Corporate Governance is Measured using the managerial approach of the properties and proportion of commissioner board.

Conservatism is a principle which most affect the accounting valuation (Sterling, 1970 in Watts, 2003a). Because of that conservatism today and still have an important role in accounting practices. Conservatism is defined as a concept for delaying the recognition of future cash inflows (Watts, 1993), and as a conservative accounting is generally stated that the accountant should report the accounting information of the lowest of several possible values for assets and income, as well as the highest of several possible value of liabilities and expenses (Hendriksen, 1992). This research is intended to examine both cross-sectionally and inter-temporally the Correlation Between financial leverage and systematic risk (beta). Financial leverage is usually Considered as one proxy of risk derived from financial data and domain name as one That has Distinctive determinants. Beta, on the other domain, is regarded as one proxy of risk derived from the market That has Some other determinants. That it is the research tries to combine both cross-sectionally and inter-temporally the two domains That most of the accounting Researchers little to devote Themselves.

Cross-sectionally, this result is fail to support Hypothesis 1, that is the relations Between financial leverage and systematic risk 'Will Be Stronger Pls sizes of the firms are relatively Smaller That the other firms and conversely, the relations Between financial leverage and systematic risk' Will Be Pls Stronger is the relatively larger size That the others. On the other test, the inter-temporally the result shows, That financial leverage is significantly and symmetrically related to beta. That this means the two variables show bidirectional causality. The high (low) beta cans result in the high (low) financial leverage; and on the contrary, the high (low) financial leverage cans result in the high (low) beta. That means this hypothesis 4a is supported. Nevertheless, the conditioning variables (operating leverage and size) do not significantly influence the causal relations Between the beta and financial leverage. This research is intended to analyze the cross-sectional and temporal relationship between financial leverage and systematic risk or beta.

Financial leverage is usually considered a proxy for risk based financial data company that is usually considered a single domain that has a separate determinant; while on the one hand, that is considered a proxy beta risk sourced from the market which also has its own determinants. But, unfortunately, some researchers have not tried to connect the two proxies of risk by entering a few variables that affect human relations in a more intense both in cross-sectional and temporal.

The first domain of research, namely the determinant of financial leverage analysis, among others, carried out by Gupta (1969), Ferry and Jones (1979), Kale, Noe, and Ramirez (1991) and others. In its findings, issued financial leverage as the dependent variable which is influenced by various independent variables such as size, growth, industry, business risks and others. While research related to determinants of systematic risk and both are trying to connect between the two domains can look back on the findings of Hamada (1972), Ben-Zion and Shalit (1975), Mandelker and Rhee (1984), Bowman (1979, 1981 ), Robichek and Cohn (1974), Melicher and Rush (1974), etc. Or financial literature as in Foster (1986).Original Title. The purpose of this study is to examine the relation between accounting measures of total firm risk and the level f underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). A number of studies have shown an association between market and accounting betas. However, most of the studies are performed using a sample of large established firms for which both accounting and market betas can be computed.

In case of IPO firms, market betas cannot be computed due to the data limitations associated with private firms. Due to limited information available prior to IPO dates, in particular financial reports, one has to use a proxy to measure risk in an IPO. Accounting variables have been prominently known as potential proxy for ex ante uncertainty in an IPO. Theoretical and empirical evidence has indicated that certain accounting measures can be used as proxies for total firm risk, that is, they could determine the riskiness of a corporation (Lev, 1974; Bowman, 1979; DeAngelo, 1990, among others).

The literature also suggests that accounting information is relevant in determining the value and thus the riskiness of a corporation through the use of accounting analysis (Brealy and Myers, 1996; Benninga and Sarig, 1997; White et al., 1998, among others). Since most of the information available in the prospectus is accounting information, it is arguable that this information represents a potential source for assessing the quality of the issuing firm. Some have also advocated the possibility of using in assessing the value of firm making an IPO (Beaver et al., 1970; Foster, 1986; Lev, 1989; Berstein and Wild, 1998; Noland and Pavlik, 1998). Moreover, Ryan (1997), based on his survey relating accounting numbers and company risk, notes the possibility of incorporating accounting information for measuring the risk of a firm making an IPO in the absence of ex post risk measures prior to the offering. Thus, the focus of the current study is to examine whether accounting measures of total firm risk are associated with the uncertainty surrounding an IPO. Miles and Snow's strategy firm divide into four types, Which are Prospector, defender, analyzer and reaction, with Prospector and defender as the two extremes.

The Objectives of this research are to empirically examine the differences in accounting performance Between Prospector and defender firms and the differences in market reaction as well. Measured by performance are accounting earnings before tax, discontinued operations and extraordinary items, sales growth and dividend payout ratio. Market reaction is proxied by actual cumulative abnormal returns. Sample of this research consists of 60 firms, 33 firms are categorized as prospectors and 27 firms are categorized as Defenders. Data of this research are analyzed using Mann-Whitney U test.

The results of this research show That there are no differences in earnings before tax, discontinued operations and extraordinary items, sales growth and market reaction Prospector Between firms and defender firms. On the contrary, this research found That dividend payout ratio of defender firms are higher than dividend payout ratio of Prospector firms, as Predicted. (2005) divides the marketing strategies into four types, namely prospectors, analyzers, low cost and differentiated Defenders Defenders. Miles and Snow (1978) divided the four typology of corporate strategy, the Prospector, defender, analyzer and reaction.

Prospector and defender both interpret as an extreme strategy is different. Prospector is a strategy that identifies and develops new products and exploit market opportunities, while the defender is a strategy that tends to maintain the market that has been achieved and a stable product with low price (low leadership cost). The purpose of this study was to obtain empirical evidence of differences in market reaction to accounting performance measures on two extreme types of marketing strategies, the Prospector and defender. This research refers to research Habbe (2001) that tests on the differences in accounting performance measures for companies that bertipologi Prospector and defender, and is associated with stock price. Habbe (2001) could not find evidence of a link between the stock price with the company strategy Prospector and defender. Therefore, this study wanted to see the consistency of the results of research Habbe (2001) by testing in the period after the crisis.

In the eyes of operations management, corporate strategy is supported and shaped by strategic capabilities. Wheelwright (1984) argues that strategic capabilities in manufacturing companies is the ability to produce: (1) with low cost, (2) with high quality, (3) reliable and quick in delivery, and (4) flexibility in the choice of the combination and volume of products. Is the main occupation of manufacturing companies to develop, nurture, and memandirikan these strategic capabilities.

It is expected that positive correlations will appear in strategic decision making and better performance (Roth and Miller, 1990; Swamidass and Newell, 1987). According to agency theory, the separation between ownership and management company can cause conflict. Conflict called the agency conflict due to related parties who are principals (who gave the contract or shareholders) and agents (who receive funds under management contracts and principals) have conflicting interests.

When agents and principals seek to maximize their own utility, and have different desires and motivations, there is reason to believe that the agent (management) do not always act according to desire principals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The idea that the management can take action only provides benefits for themselves based on an assumption that states every person has the self-seeking behavior or self-Interested behavior. Desire, motivation and utilities that are not the same between management and shareholders raises the possibility of adverse action management shareholders, among other things tend to behave unethically and accounting fraud. Agency conflict can lead to the nature of an opportunistic earnings management reports to maximize his personal interests. If this happens will result in lower earnings quality. Subramanyam (1996) in Siregar and Main (2005) argued that one measure of corporate performance that is often used as a basis for decision-making is the company's profit generated. Earnings are measured on an accrual basis is considered a better measure of company performance than operating cash flows because accruals reduces the time and mismatching problems inherent in the use of short-term cash flow (Dechow, 1994).

Prior research stated Relationship Between That there are information technology and corporate performance, but another research note stated That Relationship Between there are information technology and corporate performance. Most studies have overlooked an intermediate organizational capabilities Important That Mediate the Relationship Between information technology and corporate performance, Standard and Poor 'knowledge management capability. Recent research interest in the knowledge management Phenomenon That indicates knowledge management capability Mediators Between Could be information technology and corporate performance. Research gap motivated to examine the effects of information technology relatedness on corporate performance through the mediation of knowledge management capability. The current study hypothesizes That complementarity of the four dimensions of information technology relatedness is positively effect on cross-unit knowledge management capability of a firm multibusiness and complementarity of product knowledge management capability, customer knowledge management capability, and managerial knowledge management capability has a positive effect on multibusiness corporate performance of a firm.

A survey was mailed (520 questionnaire) to general banks in central Java That proxied by information technology managers and business managers as the research sample. The response rate 27.3% digit with 142 respondents. Used to examine hypothesized Structural Equation Model with the AMOS program. Current developments in information technology provides many services on various aspects of business activity (Mc.Leoad RJ, 1997, Indriantoro, 2000).

Information technology is part of information systems and information technology refers to technology used in conveying and processing information (Aji, 2005). Information technology has brought fundamental changes to the organization both private and public organizations. Therefore, information technology becomes a very important thing in determining the competitiveness and the ability of companies to improve business performance in the future.

Information technology resources to be a good consideration for managers and consultants, in determining a company's success in the future (Devaraj and Kohli, 2003). The relationship between information technology and corporate performance to be of interest to academics and the practitioners.

Several studies have been done by previous researchers found a significant relationship between information technology with corporate performance. Kelley (1994), Siegel and Griliches (1992) in Devaraj and Kohli (2003) states that some of the research found a positive effect of information technology on firm performance at the industry level.

Diewert and Smith (1994), Hitt and Brynjoltsson (1995), the Board and Min (1997) in Devaraj and Kohli (2003) indicates that there is a positive relationship between technology and corporate performance.

Sistem Pengendalian Manajemen Sektor Publik

AK.18.UPAYA PEMERINTAH DAERAH KAB. SLEMAN UNTUK MENINGKATKAN PENDAPATAN ASLI DAERAH DALAM RANGKA OTONOM 1 JANUARI 2001UGM,2001AK.19.RANCANGAN ORGANISASI SISTEM PENGENDALIAN INTERN PEMERINTAH DAERAH: DALAM KERANGKA OTONOM DAERAHUGM,2001AK.20.PENGARUH GAYA KEPEMIMPINAN DAN KARAKTERISTIK PERSONAL TERHADAP KEPUASAN KERJAUGM,2000AK.21.HUBUNGAN ANTARA PERILAKU PENGURUS DENGAN PARTISIPASI ANGGOTA KUD DI KAB.